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The concept of relevance between classical propositional formulae, deﬁned in terms of
letter-sharing, has been around for a long time. But it began to take on a fresh life in the
late 1990s when it was reconsidered in the context of the logic of belief change. Two new
ideas appeared in independent work of Odinaldo Rodrigues and Rohit Parikh: the relation
of relevance was considered modulo the choice of a background belief set, and the belief
set was put into a canonical form, called its ﬁnest splitting. In the ﬁrst part of this paper,
we recall the ideas of Rodrigues and Parikh, and show that they yield equivalent deﬁnitions
of what may be called canonical cell/path relevance. The second part presents the main
new result of the paper: while the relation of canonical relevance is syntax-independent
in the usual sense of the term, it nevertheless remains language-dependent in a deeper
sense, as is shown with an example. The ﬁnal part of the paper turns to questions of
application, where we present a new concept of parameter-sensitive relevance that relaxes
the Rodrigues/Parikh deﬁnition, allowing it to take into account extra-logical sources as
well as purely logical ones.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
From syntactic to canonical cell/path relevance
1. Logical relevance as a two-place relation between formulae
Attempts to give formal expression to the notion of relevance between propositional formulae go back at least to Belnap
[2], who suggested that a necessary, but not suﬃcient, condition for one formula to be relevant to another is that they share
some elementary letter. We call this syntactical relevance.
Deﬁnition 1.1. Let a,b be formulae of a given propositional logic. They are syntactically relevant to each other iff they share
some elementary letter.
In the same paper, Belnap went on to propose that relevance of antecedent to consequent should serve as an adequacy
condition for any acceptable entailment relation in propositional logic. While classical logic fails syntactic relevance, his
subclassical logic E (for ‘entailment’) satisﬁes that formal condition, as do a number of other subsystems of classical logic
that came to be known as ‘relevance logics’.
The present paper is not at all concerned with such relevance logics, and we have no desire to weaken the classical one.
We are interested in the concept of relevance itself. Our purpose is to see how far the simple idea of letter-sharing may be
developed into a well-behaved formal account of relevance in classical propositional contexts, and examine its application
to the theory of belief change.
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equivalent to a′,b′ respectively, and a relevant to b but a′ not relevant to b′ . Moreover (2), for any a,b there are a′,b′ to
which they are respectively classically equivalent, with a′ syntactically relevant to b′ .
Example 1.1. For (1), the formula ¬p ∧ (¬p ∨ q) is syntactically relevant to q, but the former is classically equivalent to ¬p
which is not relevant to q when these letters are chosen as distinct. For (2), just put e.g. a′ = a∨(r∧¬r) and b′ = b∨(r∧¬r).
Notation. We are using p,q, . . . for elementary letters, a,b, . . . , x, y, . . . for arbitrary formulae, A, B, . . . , K , . . . for sets of
formulae, and ,  for the relations of classical propositional consequence and equivalence. Classical consequence as an
operation is written Cn, with Cn(A) = {x : A  x} as usual. A formula is called contingent iff it is neither a tautology nor a
contradiction.
To overcome the shortcomings of the syntactic notion, an obvious ﬁrst move is to express each formula in its least
letter-set, using the well-known least letter-set theorem:
Theorem 1.1. For every set A of formulae, there is a unique least set of elementary letters such that A may equivalently be expressed
using only letters from that set.
Example 1.2. The unique least letter-set of ¬p∧ (¬p∨ q) is {p} since ¬p∧ (¬p∨ q) is equivalent to ¬p. On the other hand,
the unique least letter-set of ¬p ∧ (¬r ∨ q) is {p,q, r}, as the formula is not equivalent to any other formula lacking any of
those letters.
Comments on least letter-set theorem. This theorem should ﬁgure in every textbook of elementary logic, but in fact is
rarely so much as mentioned. We recall:
• Strictly speaking, it holds in this simple form only when the language has a primitive zero-ary operator (propositional
constant) such as the falsum ⊥. In such a language, the least letter-set of any tautology or contradiction is ∅. Without
a zero-ary connective, say with just ¬,∧,∨, tautologies and contradictions have many minimal letter-sets (in fact, all
the singleton letter sets), but no least one (since no formula is bereft of letters). For simplicity of formulation, in this
paper we work with the falsum.
• Intuitively, the least letter-set theorem is just what anyone would expect, but it needs proof. Getting minimal letter sets
is trivial since every formula contains only ﬁnitely many letters. But getting a least one (which, by the antisymmetry of
set-inclusion, will be unique) requires a bit more work – see e.g. the appendix of Makinson [5].
• Letters in the least letter-set of A are said to be essential (to A) or irredundant (in A), those outside are called inessential
or redundant (in A).
• With this terminology, the theorem may be stated in another manner: the set of all letters separately redundant in A,
is jointly redundant in A, in the sense that A may equivalently be expressed without any of them.
When a formula a has no redundant letters, i.e. when all letters occurring in a are in its least letter-set, we say that it is in
least letter-set form. It is convenient to use a choice function, writing a∗ for an arbitrarily chosen formula in least letter-set
form that is equivalent to a. The formula a∗ is called a least letter-set version of a. Likewise for sets A of formulae.
Deﬁnition 1.2. Let a,b be formulae of classical propositional logic. They are said to be essentially relevant to each other
iff a∗,b∗ share some elementary letter. Equivalently: iff every formula equivalent to a shares a letter with every formula
equivalent to b.
Example 1.3. Although ¬p ∧ (¬p ∨ q) is syntactically relevant to q, it is not essentially so, since (¬p ∧ (¬p ∨ q))∗ = ¬p
shares no letter with q∗ = q.
Features of essential relevance.
• It is syntax-independent in the usual sense: when a,b are tautologically equivalent to a′,b′ respectively, then a is
essentially relevant to b iff a′ is essentially relevant to b′ (immediate from deﬁnition).
• No two distinct elementary letters are relevant to each other (immediate from deﬁnition).
• It is symmetric (immediate from deﬁnition).
• Reﬂexive? Nearly: every contingent formula is relevant to itself. Non-contingent formulae are not relevant to anything
(given the presence of the falsum in our language).
• Not transitive. Example: p is essentially relevant to p ∧ q which is so to q, but p is not to q.
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Take contingent a, c. Since they are contingent, a∗ and c∗ contain letters p and q. Put b = p∧q = b∗ . Then a is essentially
relevant to b, also b to c, so transitive closure would make a relevant to c.
This is all part of the folklore and well documented in the literature (see Appendix A). However, things began to take a fresh
turn in the late 1990s, when a few people began thinking about relevance in the light of formal accounts of belief change.
Two basic insights emerged. The ﬁrst was that in that context, the relevance or irrelevance of one formula to another may
be taken to depend not only on the formulae themselves but also on the choice of a background belief set. The second was
that this belief set may be given a canonical form known as its ﬁnest splitting.
As these developments are not very widely known, we explain and comment on them in the following two sections.
To help the reader keep track of successive deﬁnitions, Appendix B contains a table of all the different kinds of relevance
examined in the text.
2. Path-relevance modulo a belief set
Consider any three distinct elementary letters p,q, r. They are not essentially relevant to each other. Now consider the
belief set K = {p → q,q → r}. Then it is natural to say that from the point of view of K, the letter p is relevant to q,q is
relevant to r, and p is indirectly relevant to r. This suggests the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Rodrigues). Let a,b be formulae of classical propositional logic, and let K be a set of formulae serving as a
belief set. We say that a is path-relevant to b (mod K ) iff there is a ﬁnite sequence x0, . . . , xn+1 (n  0) of formulae with
x0 = a∗, xn+1 = b∗, x1, . . . , xn ∈ K , and each xi shares at least one letter with xi+1.
Comments. Note that x1, . . . , xn are required to be elements of K . Thus we are looking at ﬁnite paths through K . On the
other hand, it is not required that either of x0 = a∗, xn+1 = b∗ is in K (although of course they may be). We do not require
that K is closed under consequence (though it may be): a belief set is understood to be an arbitrary set of formulae of
propositional logic.
History. Essentially this notion was introduced by Rodrigues in his thesis [7], Appendix A, Deﬁnition 8.14. It was also used
by Renata Wassermann in her thesis [10] and in subsequent papers e.g. Riana and Wassermann [8]. Actually, these authors
took a,b instead of a∗,b∗ in the deﬁnition, but we have reﬁned it to ensure that it is syntax-independent in those two
arguments.
Path-relevance generalizes essential relevance in a natural way: the latter amounts to the case n = 0 in Deﬁnition 2.1.
Like essential relevance, path relevance is:
• Syntax-independent in a,b, symmetric, almost reﬂexive (in the same sense), not transitive (even when n > 0).
But with K as parameter, new features emerge. One is rather positive:
• Distinct elementary letters can be relevant to each other (mod K ). Example: Modulo K = {p → q,q → r,¬s}, p is path-
relevant to r but not to s.
However, some other features are rather undesirable:
• The relation is syntax-dependent in K . Example: Add to the above K the formula (r → s)∨ (s → r). As this is a tautology,
it does not change the strength of K . But p is now path-relevant to s.
• The relation trivializes when the belief set is closed under classical consequence. That is, when K = Cn(K ), any two
contingent formulae a,b are path-relevant to each other modulo K. Reason: Since a,b are contingent, each of a∗,b∗ has
at least one letter. Take any letter p in a∗ , any letter q in b∗ and note that Cn(K ) contains any tautology in these letters,
e.g. (p ∨ ¬p) ∨ (q ∨ ¬q).
Can we get around these unpleasant features? One might try tweaking Deﬁnition 2.1 by replacing K by its least letter-set
version K ∗ . However, this does nothing to eliminate syntax-dependence in K . Example: Both K = {p ∧ q} and the equivalent
J = {p,q} are already in least letter-set form, but under Deﬁnition 2.1 we have p path-relevant to q modulo K , but not so
modulo J .
A better idea is needed, and one was provided by Rohit Parikh in [6]. As well as minimizing the set of elementary letters,
we need to disentangle them. The formulae in the background belief set K need to be ‘combed out’ so that their letters are
not mixed up with each other more than necessary. In other words, we need to render K as modular as possible. Parikh
made this idea precise with his concept of the ﬁnest splitting of a belief set.
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We begin with the deﬁnition of a splitting of a belief set K , and then pass to that of a ﬁnest splitting. Notation: We
write E(K ) for the set of all elementary letters occurring in formulae of K , and E0(K ) to be the least letter-set of K , i.e.
E0(K ) = E(K ∗).
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Parikh). Let K be a contingent belief set, expressed in the language of classical propositional logic (with a
zero-ary connective). Let E= {Ei}i∈I be a partition of its least letter-set E0(K ), which by contingency will be non-empty. We
say that E is a splitting of K iff there is a family {Bi}i∈I of sets of formulae such that each E(Bi) ⊆ Ei and K ⋃{Bi}i∈I .
In other words, iff K can be represented as the union of belief sets each of which uses only letters from one of the cells of
the partition.
Background on partitions. (1) Recall that a partition of a non-empty set is a family of disjoint non-empty subsets of that
set, whose union exhausts the set. (2) The partitions of a set can be put in one-one correspondence with the equivalence
relations over the set. (3) One partition is said to be ﬁner than another iff the equivalence relation associated with the
former is included (set-theoretically) in the equivalence relation associated with the latter; equivalently, iff every cell of the
ﬁrst partition is a subset of a cell of the second one. (4) Given any non-empty family of partitions of a set, the intersection
of all the equivalence relations associated with partitions in the family is itself an equivalence relation over the set, and so
corresponds to a partition of the set. With respect to the ﬁneness relation, it is the inﬁmum (alias greatest lower bound or
glb) of the family of partitions.
Comments on the deﬁnition of splitting. (1) A splitting of K is thus a special kind of partition of the least letter-set of
K ; it is not a partition of K itself. (2) While each E(Bi) ⊆ Ei ⊆ E0(K ) it is not required that the sets Bi ⊆ K , although
their union
⋃{Bi}i∈I must be classically equivalent to K . (3) Since each E(Bi) ⊆ Ei and the Ei are pairwise disjoint, the Bi
must be ‘almost’ pairwise disjoint, in the sense that they share no formulae containing elementary letters. (4) Since E0(K )
is the least letter-set of K and K is assumed contingent, it follows that in a splitting each Bi is non-empty and in fact
E(Bi) = Ei . (5) This deﬁnition (and all those that follow) may be extended to cover the limiting cases that K is inconsistent
or tautologous, but at the cost of limiting-case clauses in deﬁnitions, theorems and proofs that distract from the main ideas.
History. Actually, Parikh [6] deﬁned splittings of K for any letter-set E ⊇ E0(K ), e.g. E could be E(K ) or the set E(L) of all
letters of the language. However, it simpliﬁes formulations to ﬁx it at E0(K ). For instance, when E ⊃ E0(K ) then comment
(4) above can fail at the edges. Example: Put K = {p,q ∨ ¬q}, E = E(K ) = {p,q}, B1 = {p} but B2 can be {¬⊥} or ∅ so that
E(B2) ⊂ E2 = {q}.
Example 3.1. K = {p → ¬q,¬q → r, p ∨ s,¬s, (r → t) ∨ (t → r)}.
• E(K ) = {p,q, r, s, t} but t is redundant, so E0(K ) = {p,q, r, s}.
• The coarsest splitting of K is evidently the singleton partition of E0(K ) with E0(K ) = {p,q, r, s} itself as the only cell,
so that
⋃{Bi}i∈I = B1 = {p → ¬q,¬q → r, p ∨ s,¬s}  K . But we can do better than that.
• A less coarse splitting of K partitions E into two cells E1 = {p,q} and E2 = {r, s}, taking B1 = {p,¬q}, B2 = {r,¬s}, so
that K  B1 ∪ B2.
• The ﬁnest splitting of K partitions E into four singleton cells {p}, {q}, {r}, {s} with B1 = {p}, B2 = {¬q}, B3 = {r}, B4 =
{¬s}, so that K  B1 ∪ · · · ∪ B4.
In this very simple example, the ﬁnest splitting of E has singleton cells and the associated sets B1 to B4 consist of
literals. Of course, neither of these features need hold. For instance, take K = {(p → q) ∧ (r → s)}. Its ﬁnest splitting is into
the two-element cells {p,q}, {r, s}, with B1 = {p → q}, B2 = {r → s} consisting of non-literals.
Theorem 3.1. (See [6].) Every contingent set K of formulae of classical propositional logic has a unique ﬁnest splitting.
History. Theorem 3.1 was established for the ﬁnite case by Parikh [6]. It was extended to the inﬁnite case by Kourousias
and Makinson [3], using a new form of interpolation called ‘parallel interpolation’. Both parallel interpolation and the ﬁnest
splitting theorem may be extended to ﬁrst-order logic.
Comments on the theorem. Strictly speaking, it is the ﬁnest splitting E= {Ei}i∈I of elementary letters that is unique. Given
such a family, there will evidently be many families {Bi}i∈I with ⋃{Bi}i∈I  K and E(Bi) ⊆ Ei . However, since in fact each
E(Bi) = Ei , the different ways of choosing a given Bi do not affect its letters. Moreover, it turns out that:
Observation 3.2. For contingent K the Bi associated with the ﬁnest splitting of K are unique up to tautological equivalence. That is: let
K be a contingent belief set, and E = {Ei}i∈I its ﬁnest splitting. Suppose both K ⋃{Bi}i∈I and K ⋃{B ′i}i∈I where E(Bi) ⊆ Ei
and E(B ′) ⊆ Ei . Then each Bi  B ′ .i i
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Again, it simpliﬁes formulations if we use a choice function:
Deﬁnition 3.2. For contingent K , write K# for
⋃{Bi}i∈I for some particular such family {Bi}i∈I . We abuse terminology a
little by also calling K# the ﬁnest splitting of K .
Comments on the deﬁnition of K#. (1) Clearly, when K1  K2 then K#1 = K#2 . (2) Keep in mind that the family {Bi}i∈I
is not necessarily a partition of K , but is formed from a certain partition of its least letter-set E0(K ). (3) Note that when
the ﬁnest splitting E = {Ei}i∈I of K has at least two cells, then K# cannot be closed under classical consequence – the
conjunction of any two formulae from different cells will be in Cn(K#) but cannot be in K#. Even when there is only one
cell, K# need not be closed under consequence. (4) As we have deﬁned it, the ﬁnest splitting K# is always a least letter-set
version of K . However, a least letter-set version K ∗ of K need not be a ﬁnest splitting, as in the following simple example.
Example 3.2. Put K = {p ∧ q}. Then K is already in a least letter-set form, since there is no equivalent set of formulae in
fewer letters. But it is not in a ﬁnest splitting form, since K  {p} ∪ {q}, which partitions E(K ) into two singleton cells.
Indeed, if we take a least letter-set version of a belief set K and tangle the letters up in any way we like, then so long as
we keep it equivalent to K and do not introduce fresh letters, we are still in the least letter-set but can be far from a ﬁnest
splitting.
4. Using ﬁnest splittings to deﬁne canonical relevance (modulo a belief set)
How can ﬁnest splitting help make the notion of relevance modulo a belief set fully syntax-independent in K as well
as in a, x? We may see the ﬁnest splitting K# =⋃{Bi}i∈I of K as a canonical form for the belief set K , disentangling the
roles of the different elementary letters as far as is possible without altering the power of K and at the same time (under
our deﬁnition) eliminating redundant letters. We can then reﬁne Rodrigues’ notion of path-relevance by taking the path
through this canonical representation K# instead of through K itself. Thus, replacing x1, . . . , xn ∈ K by x1, . . . , xn ∈ K# in
Deﬁnition 2.1, we have the following:
Deﬁnition 4.1. Let a,b be formulae of classical propositional logic, K a contingent set of formulae serving as a belief set,
and K# the ﬁnest splitting of K . We say that a is canonically path-relevant to b (mod K ) iff there is a ﬁnite sequence
x0, . . . , xn+1 (n 0) of formulae with x0 = a∗, xn+1 = b∗, x1, . . . , xn ∈ K#, and each xi sharing at least one letter with xi+1.
Features of canonical path-relevance modulo K .
• This time x1, . . . , xn are required to be elements of the canonical form K#, so we are looking at ﬁnite paths through K#
(rather than through K itself). As before, it is not required that either of x0 = a∗, xn+1 = b∗ is in K# (although of course
they may be).
• As desired, path-relevance becomes syntax-independent in the usual sense that it is invariant under logical equivalence
in argument K as well as in a,b. This follows from the fact, noted in the comments after Deﬁnition 3.2, that equivalent
belief sets have the same ﬁnest splitting K#.
• Like plain path-relevance, it is symmetric but not transitive (in the arguments a,b with K ﬁxed); almost reﬂexive (in
the same sense as before); distinct elementary letters can be relevant to each other (mod K ).
There is another way of arriving at the same concept. It also uses Parikh’s notion of the ﬁnest splitting K# of K , but does
not consider paths. Instead, it looks at cells.
Deﬁnition 4.2. (See [6].) Let a,b be formulae of classical propositional logic and K be a contingent set of formulae serving
as a belief set with E = {Ei}i∈I the ﬁnest splitting of K . We say that a is canonically cell-relevant to b (mod K ) iff either a∗
shares some letter with b∗ , or there is a cell Ei of E such that each of a∗ and b∗ shares some letter (not necessarily the
same letter) with Ei .
More formally: iff either E(a∗) ∩ E(b∗) is non-empty, or for some i ∈ I , each of the sets E(a∗) ∩ Ei and E(b∗) ∩ Ei is
non-empty.
In the illustration of the principal case of the deﬁnition (Table 4.1), the ﬁnest partition E of K has three cells, each
containing two elementary letters. The letters in a∗ and b∗ are disjoint, but there is a cell (the middle one) that contains
letters r, s from E(a∗), E(b∗) respectively. Thus a is canonically cell-relevant to b (mod K ). However, if E(b∗) consisted of
just t,u then a would not be canonically cell-relevant to b (mod K ).
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Illustration of canonical cell-relevance.
E1 E2 E3
p q r s t u
E(a∗) E(b∗)
History. Actually, Deﬁnition 4.2 is implicit rather than explicit in Parikh [6]. Moreover, both that paper and Kourousias and
Makinson [3] use E(a), E(b) rather than E(a∗), E(b∗).
Surprisingly, the following equivalence does not appear to have been noticed in the literature.
Theorem4.1. Canonical path-relevance is equivalent to canonical cell-relevance. In detail: let a,b be formulae of classical propositional
logic, and let K be a contingent set of formulae serving as a belief set. Then a is canonically path-relevant to b (modK ) iff it is canonically
cell-relevant to b (mod K ).
Sketch of proof. Left to right, the essential idea is that there can be no paths across cells. Right to left, paths must span the
cells. For details, see Appendix C.
Remark on the theorem. The ﬁrst disjunct in the deﬁnition of canonical cell relevance corresponds to the case n = 0 in the
deﬁnition of canonical path relevance.
Summary of the story so far. By using Parikh’s notion of the ﬁnest splitting of K , we can reﬁne Rodrigues’ account of path-
relevance to make it syntax-independent in all three arguments a,b, K . This notion of canonical path-relevance is equivalent
to the more semantic-looking one of canonical cell-relevance. The equivalence suggests robustness of the concept, which
henceforth we call simply canonical relevance.
Warning. Canonical relevance depends only on the logical power of K , but is not monotonically increasing in that power.
When K1  K2 then it does not follow that if a is canonically relevant to b modulo K2 then it is so modulo K1. Example:
Put K1 = {p ∧ q}, K2 = {p → q}. Then K1  K2 and p is canonically relevant to q modulo K2, but is not so modulo K1.
5. Syntax-independent – but still language-dependent
As remarked in the preceding section, canonical relevance is syntax-independent in the usual sense that it is invariant
under logical equivalence in all three of its arguments a,b, K . However, there is also a sense in which it is still not fully
language-independent. Its deﬁnition, whether via paths or cells, gives a privileged place to elementary letters over com-
pound formulae. As a result, it turns out that whether one state of affairs is relevant to another depends on how we deploy
elementary letters in representing them. This is the ﬁrst main new result of the paper.
Example 5.1. Consider the belief set {p ↔ q, (p ↔ q) ↔ p}. Clearly, p is not canonically relevant to (p ↔ q) ↔ p modulo
the belief set, since p = p∗, ((p ↔ q) ↔ p)∗ = q, and the belief set is equivalent to {p,q}. Now suppose we represent our
states of affairs in a different manner. Noting that the formulae p and p ↔ q are logically independent of each other (all four
combinations of their truth and falsity are possible), we might let the letter p continue to represent the same state of affairs
as before, but use the letter q to stand for the one previously denoted by p ↔ q. Then the formula q ↔ p stands for the state
of affairs previously represented by (p ↔ q) ↔ p. So under our second representation scheme, the belief set is written as
{q,q ↔ p}, which is again equivalent to {p,q}. We now ask whether p (corresponding to the old p) is canonically relevant to
q ↔ p (corresponding to the old (p ↔ q) ↔ p) modulo the new belief set. This time the answer is trivially positive (modulo
any belief set) since p∗ = p shares a letter with (q ↔ p)∗ = q ↔ p. Changing the way in which we represent states of affairs
has thus changed the answer to our question!
In case this looks like a sleight-of-hand, we review Example 5.1 more formally. First, we give the construction itself.
Observation 5.1. Let L be the propositional language generated by the letters {p,q}, and deﬁne f : L → L by putting f (p) = p, f (q) =
p ↔ q, and homomorphic for compound formulae. Then there is a bijection ϕ between valuations on the language such that for all
formulae a ∈ L, v(a) = v ′( f (a)), where v ′ : L → {0,1} is the counterpart ϕ(v) of v : L → {0,1}.
The homomorphism condition means of course that f (¬a) = ¬ f (a), f (a ∧ b) = f (a) ∧ f (b), f (a ∨ b) = f (a) ∨ f (b),
f (⊥) = ⊥. The good behaviour of the formula-homomorphism f with respect to the valuation-bijection ϕ gives mathemat-
ical content to the intuitive idea that f does not alter semantic structure; more speciﬁcally, that the formula a represents
(under v) the same ‘state of affairs’ as f (a) does (under v ′). For a proof of Observation 5.1, see Appendix C.
Now checking for what is relevant to what, we see (Fig. 5.1):
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• On the one hand, trivially the formula p is canonically relevant to q ↔ p modulo the belief set K = {q,q ↔ p} (or any
other) since p∗ = p shares a letter with (q ↔ p)∗ = q ↔ p.
• On the other hand, f (p) = p is not canonically relevant to f (q ↔ p) = (p ↔ q) ↔ p modulo f (K ) = f ({q,q ↔ p}) =
{p ↔ q, (p ↔ q) ↔ p}, since ( f (p))∗ = p∗ = p while ( f (q ↔ p))∗ = ((p ↔ q) ↔ p)∗ = q and ( f (K ))# = {p,q} = K#.
Thus, while the concept of canonical relevance is syntax-independent as usually understood, i.e. invariant under logical
equivalence in all three of its arguments, it nevertheless remains language-dependent, in the deeper sense that it is not
invariant under different representations of the same state of affairs – even when the representations are in the same
language. To this extent it is not entirely semantic, retaining a residual syntactic element that may be diﬃcult or impossible
to eliminate.
The phenomenon does not appear to have been discussed in the literature, but may be of some importance. It goes
well beyond the problem of relevance. Any concept whose deﬁnition gives a privileged role to elementary letters (or in the
case of predicate logic, atomic formulae) is likely to be language-dependent in the same way. This seems to be the case,
for example, with certain concepts that have been used in artiﬁcial intelligence to deﬁne particular forms of nonmonotonic
reasoning, notably the closed world assumption and circumscription.
How should the language-dependence of the relation of canonical relevance be appreciated? Two contrasting attitudes
suggest themselves.
• It may be felt that in view of this feature, canonical relevance is not much better behaved than its less sophisticated
predecessors, which were seen to be syntax-dependent in one or more of their arguments a, x, K . For this reason it
should simply be abandoned (along with all other language-dependent concepts such as circumscription).
• On the other hand, it may be felt that language-dependent notions (and perhaps even some syntax-dependent ones) do
have their legitimate uses, particularly in computational contexts.
Without taking a deﬁnite stance on this delicate question, we note that canonical relevance has very interesting interactions
with operations of belief change, which we now examine.
6. Respecting relevance in belief change
How far do operations of belief change in the manner of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson [1], brieﬂy AGM, respect
relevance? We begin by reviewing the state of play, focussing on the operation of contraction (thus leaving aside revision)
and omitting all proofs (which can be found in Kourousias and Makinson [3]).
Deﬁnition 6.1. We say that an operation – of contraction on a contingent belief set K respects canonical relevance (brieﬂy,
when no ambiguity is possible, respects relevance) iff whenever K  x but K − a  x then a is canonically relevant to
x (mod K ). Contrapositively, when K  x and a is canonically irrelevant to x (mod K ) then still K − a  x.
Comment. When K is closed under classical consequence, i.e. when K = Cn(K ) then for AGM contraction K − a is also
closed under consequence, so we have K  x iff x ∈ K and likewise K − a  x iff x ∈ K − a. In this situation, Deﬁnition 6.1
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Observation 6.1. (See [6].) AGM contraction can fail to respect relevance, and this can happen independently of whether K is closed
under consequence.
Example 6.1. Let p,q be two distinct elementary letters, and put K = Cn(p,q). Then there is an AGM maxichoice contraction
that puts K − p to be Cn(p ↔ q), thus eliminating not only p but also q from K . However, the letter q is canonically
irrelevant to p modulo K , because we can split E = {p,q} into E1 = {p}, E2 = {q} with K# = {p} ∪ {q}.
The example is robust in the sense that it goes through when we work with belief bases rather than belief sets already
closed under consequence. Put K0 = {p ↔ q,q}, so that Cn(K0) = K above. Then one of the AGM maxichoice base contrac-
tions puts K0 − p to be {p ↔ q}, which eliminates q. However, the eliminated letter q is canonically irrelevant to p modulo
K0 for the same reason as before.
Theorem 6.2. (See [3].) If we apply AGM contraction to the ﬁnest splitting K# of a contingent belief set K , rather than to K itself, then
it respects relevance.
Example 6.2. When given K = Cn(p,q) or K0 = {p ↔ q,q} the theorem instructs us to apply the contraction operation to
the canonical belief set K# = K#0 = {p,q}. Since there is just one maximal p-nonimplying subset of K#, namely {q}, there is
just one possible output for an AGM belief contraction K# − p, namely {q}.
Comments. (1) Actually, the observation of Parikh [6] was made for AGM revision, but the counterexamples for revision
and contraction are essentially the same. (2) Theorem 6.2 was established by Kourousias and Makinson [3] for the epsilon
version of Deﬁnition 6.1, rather than the turnstile version. When a belief set is not closed under classical consequence (as
in the case of K#) the two versions are not the same, as remarked by Pavlos Peppas (personal communication). However, it
is not diﬃcult to obtain the turnstile version of the theorem from the epsilon one, as is done in Appendix C.
7. Should canonical relevance always be respected?
Of course, we may ask whether eliminating canonically irrelevant formulae really is a shortcoming for a belief contraction
operation. Assuming that canonical relevance modulo a belief set is itself a reasonable notion to work with (despite its
language-dependence, already noted) we may still ask: is failure to respect it a defect, or just a feature, of AGM contraction?
It appears that the answer depends on whether we want our contractions to take into account only formal considerations,
or also epistemic ones. To see this, consider again the example where we wish to contract the belief base K0 = {p ↔ q,q}
by p.
We know that K#0 = {p,q}, so that while p ↔ q is canonically relevant to p modulo K ,q is not. So if the contraction is to
respect relevance, it will eliminate p ↔ q, but not q. But it may happen that the formula p ↔ q has a special place among
our beliefs. It may be more deeply entrenched, less vulnerable, or in some other way epistemically more basic than the
letters p,q or their conjunction p ∧ q, all of which are elements of Cn(K0). In that context, when discarding p we should
keep the biconditional p ↔ q and jettison the letter q. The eliminated formula q is not logically relevant to the formula
p that we are discarding, but it is epistemically so, since it occurs in a formula p ↔ q to which we are attributing special
epistemic status within the belief set.
In general, when a belief set is presented by a base, we may have differing attitudes towards the propositions in the
base. They may be there by happenstance, and any other base might be deemed as just as appropriate so long as it is
equivalent (and perhaps satisﬁes general requirements such as being computable or schematic). But other propositions may
be in the base because we want them to be there; they may have an epistemic priority over items outside the base. Even
within the base, some elements may have priority over others. From this perspective, taking epistemic matters into account,
we will not need to respect canonical relevance.
8. Parameter-sensitive relevance
If we are interested in epistemic factors in belief change, we may well wish to develop the concept of canonical relevance
to take account of them. How could we go about it? Of course, logic alone cannot specify which propositions have what
epistemic status. But it can introduce into its constructions parameters that allow such speciﬁcations to play a role. In this
section we introduce such a parameter. This is the second main new construction of the paper.
Deﬁnitions and theorems correspond to earlier unparametrized ones, and are numbered by their counterparts with a plus
sign. We begin by observing that the ﬁnest splitting theorem may be strengthened to cover an arbitrary family of splittings,
rather than just the family of all splittings of K .
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splittings of K is also a splitting of K .
Proof. The proof of Theorem 3.1 (the ﬁnest splitting theorem) that is given in Kourousias and Makinson [3] may be applied
without change.
Next, we notice that the concept of canonical cell/path relevance, which was introduced in Deﬁnition 4.2 using the ﬁnest
splitting of K , generalizes without change with respect to an arbitrary splitting. In terms of cells, for instance, we have:
Deﬁnition 4.2+. Let a,b be formulae of classical propositional logic and K be a contingent set of formulae serving as a
belief set with E = {Ei}i∈I any splitting of K . We say that a is relevant to b (mod E) iff a∗ shares some letter with b∗ , or
there is a cell Ei of E such that each of a∗ and b∗ shares some letter (not necessarily the same letter) with Ei .
The notion of respect for relevance, introduced Deﬁnition 6.1, similarly generalizes:
Deﬁnition 6.1+. Let K be a contingent set of formulae serving as a belief set, and E = {Ei}i∈I any splitting of K . We say
that an operation – of contraction on K respects relevance modulo E iff whenever K  x but K − a  x then a is relevant to x
modulo E.
With these generalized deﬁnitions available, we can now introduce a parameter R to handle extra-logical (and in par-
ticular, epistemic) sources of relevance. R is a relation between elementary letters, permitting us to stipulate that certain
letters are epistemically relevant to others.
Deﬁnition 8.1. Let K be a contingent set of formulae serving as a belief set, with E its least letter-set. Let R be any relation
between letters in E . We say that a splitting E = {Ei}i∈I of K protects R iff whenever (p,q) ∈ R then p,q are in the same
cell Ei of E.
We may now apply Theorem 3.1+ to the family of all R-protecting splittings of K :
Corollary to Theorem 3.1+. Let K be a contingent set of formulae serving as a belief set, with E its least letter-set. Let R be any
relation between letters in E. Then K has a (unique) ﬁnest R-protecting splitting.
Proof. Since R ⊆ E2, there is at least one splitting that protects R , namely the coarsest (one-cell) splitting. Hence by Theo-
rem 3.1+, the inﬁmum of all R-protecting splittings of K is a splitting of K , and it is immediate that it protects R .
The relation of relevance modulo the ﬁnest R-protecting splitting of K (rather than modulo its ﬁnest splitting) may nat-
urally be referred to as R-sensitive relevance. When the pairs in R represent declarations of epistemic connections between
letters, it may be thought of as representing epistemically sensitive relevance.
The extent to which R-sensitive relevance goes beyond canonical relevance evidently depends on how much is put into
the protected relation R . In the limiting case that R is empty, the two coincide; in the other limiting case that R contains all
pairs of letters, we get the one-cell partition of E = E0(K ) and so end up with Rodrigues’ path-relevance without splitting
as in Section 2.
We end by noting that the same proof as for Theorem 6.2 gives us more generally:
Theorem 6.2+. Let K be a contingent set of formulae serving as a belief set, with E its least letter-set. Let R be any relation between
letters in E. If we apply AGM contraction to the ﬁnest R-protecting splitting rather than to K itself, then it respects relevance modulo
that same splitting.
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For an overview and extended bibliography of work on propositional relevance as a two-place relation between formulae,
see Lang et al. [4]. This paper gives particular attention to computational questions. Although the authors mention the
seminal paper Parikh [6] in passing, they do not investigate relevance modulo the ﬁnest splitting of a background belief set.
In their treatment of the notion of an essential letter they follow Ryan [9] in dividing the concept into two parts, thereby
giving it a polarity. Expressed in the manner of the present paper, we may say that a formula a sometimes depends on a
positive value for the letter p iff there is a valuation v with v(a) = 1 but vp=0(a) = 0, where vp=0 is the valuation that
agrees with v on all letters other than p but gives p the value 0. Likewise, a sometimes depends on a negative value for the
letter p iff there is a valuation v with v(a) = 1 but vp=1(a) = 0. Evidently, the two kinds of dependence do not exclude each
other. As Lang et al. [4] observe, it is immediate that the essential letters of a formula are just those on which it sometimes
depends either positively or negatively.
Appendix B. Table of kinds of relevance discussed
This appendix contains Table B.1 of all the different kinds of relevance examined in the text.
Table B.1
Name Arguments Syntax-independent? Language-independent?
syntactic relevance formulae no no
essential relevance yes
path-relevance formulae, belief set K yes, except for K
cell-relevance
canonical (path/cell) relevance yes
R-sensitive relevance formulae, belief set K , relation R over letters yes
Appendix C. Proofs
Observation 3.2. For contingent K the Bi in the ﬁnest splittings of K are unique up to tautological equivalence. That is: let K be a
contingent belief set, and E = {Ei}i∈I its ﬁnest splitting. Suppose both K ⋃{Bi}i∈I and K ⋃{B ′i}i∈I where E(Bi) ⊆ Ei and
E(B ′i) ⊆ Ei . Then each Bi  B ′i .
Notation. We write v(X) = 1 as shorthand for v(x) = 1 for all x ∈ X , while v(X) = 0 abbreviates v(x) = 0 for some x ∈ X .
Proof. Suppose otherwise. Then there is a valuation u with say u(B j) = 1 and u(B ′j) = 0. Since K is consistent, there is
also a valuation v with v(K ) = 1 so v(Bi) = v(B ′i) = 1 for all i ∈ I . Let w be the valuation that agrees with u on all letters
in E j and agrees with v on all other letters. Then w(K ) = w(⋃{Bi}i∈I ) = 1 while also w(K ) = w(⋃{B ′i}i∈I ) = 0 giving a
contradiction.
Theorem4.1. Canonical path-relevance is equivalent to canonical cell-relevance. In detail: let a,b be formulae of classical propositional
logic, and let K be a contingent set of formulae serving as a belief set. Then a is canonically path-relevant to b (mod K ) iff it is
canonically cell-relevant to b (mod K ).
Proof. The theorem is immediate when a∗ shares a letter with b∗ . So suppose otherwise.
Left to right: Suppose that a is canonically path-relevant to b (mod K ). Then there is a ﬁnite sequence x0, . . . , xn+1 of
formulae with x0 = a∗, xn+1 = b∗ , all of x1, . . . , xn ∈ K#, and each xi sharing at least one letter with xi+1. Since a∗ shares no
letter with b∗ , we have n 1. Let p be a letter shared by x0 = a∗ and x1, and let q be a letter shared by xn and xn+1 = b∗ .
Since all of x1, . . . , xn ∈ K#, and each xi shares at least one letter with xi+1, it follows that all of the letters in x1, . . . , xn
come from the same cell Ei of the ﬁnest splitting of K . Thus in particular p and q come from the same cell Ei , so each of
the sets E(a∗) ∩ Ei and E(b∗) ∩ Ei is non-empty as required for canonical cell-relevance.
Right to left: Suppose that a is canonically cell-relevant to b (mod K ). Then there is a cell Ei of the ﬁnest splitting E of K
such that each of the sets E(a∗) ∩ Ei and E(b∗) ∩ Ei is non-empty. So there are letters p,q ∈ Ei with p occurring in a∗ and
q occurring in b∗ . Since p,q ∈ Ei and K# is in least letter-set form, they must occur in formulae y, z ∈ Bi ⊆ K#. To complete
the proof we need to show that there are x1, . . . , xn (n 0) in K# with y = x1, xn = z and each xi sharing a letter with xi+1.
But this must hold because otherwise we could take the closure {y}+ of {y} under the relation of sharing a letter, to divide
Ei further into non-empty sets E({y}+) and Ei\E({y}+) which would split K further.
Observation 5.1. Let L be the propositional language generated by the letters {p,q}, and deﬁne f : L → L by putting f (p) = p, f (q) =
p ↔ q, and homomorphic for compound formulae. Then there is a bijection ϕ between valuations on the language such that such that
for all formulae a ∈ L, v(a) = v ′( f (a)), where v ′ : L → {0,1} is the counterpart ϕ(v) of v : L → {0,1}.
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v ′(p) = v(p) and v ′(q) = v(p ↔ q). We need to check that (1) ϕ is a bijection between valuations on L, and (2) for all
formulae a ∈ L, v(a) = v ′( f (a)).
For (1), since the set of valuations is ﬁnite (4 elements), it suﬃces to show that ϕ is injective. Suppose v = w; we need
to show v ′ = w ′ . Case 1: Suppose v(p) = w(p). Then immediately v ′(p) = v(p) = w(p) = w ′(p) and we are done. Case 2:
Suppose v(p) = w(p) but v(q) = w(q). Then v(p ↔ q) = w(p ↔ q) so v ′(q) = v(p ↔ q) = w(p ↔ q) = w ′(q) and again we
are done.
For (2), it suﬃces to show that v(p) = v ′( f (p)) and v(q) = v ′( f (q)). The former is immediate since v ′( f (p)) = v ′(p) =
v(p) by the constructions of f and v ′ . For the latter, v ′( f (q)) = v ′(p ↔ q) by the construction of f . Case 1: Suppose
v(q) = 1. Then v ′(q) = v(p ↔ q) = v(p) = v ′(p) so v ′(p ↔ q) = 1, giving us v(q) = v ′( f (q)) as desired. Case 2: Suppose
v(q) = 0. Then v ′(q) = v(p ↔ q) = v(¬p) = v ′(¬p) so v ′(p ↔ q) = 0, again giving us v(q) = v ′( f (q)) as desired.
Theorem 6.2. If we apply AGM contraction to the ﬁnest splitting K# of a contingent belief set K , rather than to K itself, then it respects
relevance.
Proof. In Kourousias and Makinson [3] this was proven in an ‘epsilon version’: whenever x ∈ K# but x /∈ K# − a then a is
canonically relevant to x (mod K ). We need to derive the turnstile version of the theorem from the epsilon one. Assume
the epsilon version, i.e. that for contingent K , whenever x ∈ K# but x /∈ K# − a then a is canonically relevant to x (mod K ).
Suppose that K is contingent, K#  x, K# − a  x; we need to show that a is canonically relevant to x (mod K ).
Since K#  x we have K#  x∗ , so there are a1, . . . ,ak ∈ K# with a1 ∧ · · · ∧ ak  x∗ . Since K is consistent, we may assume
without loss of generality that each a∗i shares a letter with x
∗ . Since K# − a  x we likewise have K# − a  x∗ , so there is an
i  k with K# − a  ai , so that ai /∈ K# − a. By the epsilon version of the theorem, a is canonically relevant to ai (mod K ).
That is, there is a cell E j of the ﬁnest partition E of K such that each of the sets E(a∗) ∩ E j and E(a∗i ) ∩ E j is non-empty.
To show that a is canonically relevant to x (mod K ) and complete the proof it will suﬃce to show that E(x∗) ∩ E j is
non-empty. But since ai ∈ K# all the letters of ai come from the same cell, so E(ai) ⊆ E j . Since E(a∗i ) ⊆ E(ai) this gives us
E(a∗i ) ⊆ E j . Since a∗i shares a letter with x∗ , this tells us that E(x∗) ∩ E j is non-empty as desired.
It is also possible to prove Theorem 6.2 (turnstile version) directly, essentially by including the above considerations
within a re-run of the proof of the epsilon version in Kourousias and Makinson [3].
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